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ABSTRACT There is an increasing drive to provide improved levels of trust within an Internet-of-Things
(IoTs) environments, but the devices and sensors used tend to be limited in their capabilities for dealing
with traditional cryptography methods. Resource constraints and security are often the two major concerns
of IIoT (Industrial IoT applications and big data generation at the present time. The strict security measures
are often not significantly resource-managed and therefore, negotiation normally takes place between these.
Following this, various light-weight versions of generic security primitives have been developed for IIoT
and other resource-constrained sustainability. In this paper, we address the authentication concerns for
resource-constrained environments by designing an efficient authentication protocol. Our authentication
scheme is based on LiSP (light-weight Signcryption Protocol); however, some further customization has
been performed on it to make it more suitable for IIoT-like resource-constrained environments. We use
Keccack as the hash function in the process and Elli for light-weight public-key cryptography. We name
our authentication scheme: Extended light-weight Signcryption Protocol with Keccack (LiSP-XK). The
paper outlines a comparative analysis on our new design of authentication against a range of state-of-the-art
schemes. We find the suitability of LiSP-XK for IIoT like environments due to its lesser complexity and less
energy consumption. Moreover, the signcryption process is also beneficial in enhancing security. Overall
the paper shows that LiSP-XK is overall 35% better in efficiency as compared to the other signcryption
approaches.
INDEX TERMS Internet, IoT, security, authentication, signcryption, attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
IoT is one of the most promising technologies to be
adopted in multi-dimensional applications [1]–[3]. Automa-
tion industries, smart developments, vehicle networks, ubiq-
uitous and pervasive computing paradigm often use IoT
as backbone [4]–[6]. Even though IoT has provided many
advantages, there are some serious problems that relate to
security, privacy, compatibility and complexity [7]. As IoT
has extended to Industrial IoTs (IIoTs), smart developments
and other progressive dimensions, the number of connections
has been significantly increased. This increasing number of
devices in IoTs pose severe security challenges. For example,
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
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IIoT devices may transmit machine status and where fit-
ness devices deal with users’ personal data and health data.
Therefore, security methods must be applied at the very first
level where the devices connect to the network and gener-
ate data. Intrusion detection systems are well configured in
various networks to prevent third-party hacking of big data
from clouds [8]. At the core of security is: Confidentiality;
Integrity; and Availability (CIA). However, the other security
services such as authentication, authorization, access control
non-repudiation are also important. Authentication is the first
step to support the security of an environment. This is because
once a proper authentication is done, only legitimate users
will have the access to certain data; if authentication is not
properly implemented, any unauthorized user can enter the
network and could undertake malicious activities. Moreover,
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FIGURE 1. Three-Layer architecture of IoT.
the need of short keysize and ciphertexts in authentication is
required for resource constrained devices [9], [10].
Therefore, in this paper, we have shown the extended
design of an authentication scheme.
A. IoT ARCHITECTURE
To apply a security method such as an authentication scheme,
it is often necessary to understand the underlying architecture
of the system. The standard architecture of IoT can be con-
figured as three-layer architecture, but, depending on specific
requirements, the architecture can have five layers [11], [12].
The three-layer architecture consist of [13] (Figure 1):
• Perception Layer: The end-node devices are registered
in the network in this layer. Devices such as mobile
phones, sensors, RFIDs, andGPS equipment collect data
and transfer it to the network layer.
• Network Layer: This layer helps in collecting data
from the perception layer and sends it to the application
layer. This layer provides the connectivity to the whole
network. Security controls such as firewalls and intru-
sion detection systems (IDSs) can be added for security
provisions. Communication technologies such as 4G,
5G and beyond, ZigBee, WiFi are used for networking
in this layer.
• Application Layer: This layer is used to provide the
interfacing between an IoT network and the users. It also
uses big data analytics for understanding the application
behaviour.
Some researchers have also used five-layered architecture.
It consists of the basic three layers (as mentioned above)
and additionally adding processing layer and a business
layer. The processing layer works an intermediate layer
and helps in reserving, observing, transferring and receiv-
ing data from other layers. The business layer works as
a management layer for the IoT infrastructure, and where
the services of actual network are actually being managed.
Considering the layers of architectures, we notice that devices
connect in the perception layer. If this layer can be protected
with strong and effective security approaches, the other lay-
ers can be further protected. There are many attacks that
are exposed with IoT, including Denial-of-Service (DoS),
Man-in-the-Middle attack (MiM), identity-based attacks, and
cloning attacks [14]. One way to handle the security issues at
the device level is to use efficient encryption and authenti-
cation protocols. Encryption provides confidentiality of the
data while transferred from the perception layer to any other
of the layers, and authentication provides the verifiability of
the users’ identities. Various algorithms exist with generic
cryptographic constructions for both encryption and authen-
tication. However, these methods are not always feasible for
IoT environments due to their complexities and poor resource
utilization. Moreover, efficiency also reduces and costs
can be high.
One enhanced method is signcryption [15]. As the name
identifies, it digitally signs the message and encrypts it
in a single logical step, where the digital signature pro-
vides the authentication of the user’s device at the per-
ception layer. Such signcryption schemes are beneficial
on resource-constrained scenarios due to their reduced
computational cost and effectiveness as compared to the
sign-then-encrypt approach. In 1997, Zheng introduced
signcryption [15] and uses elliptic curve cryptography (ECC).
The basic working of signcryption is shown in Figure 2.
With the increasing demand of the efficient cryptographic
algorithms, signcryption has also extended to light-weight
signcryption algorithms, and where the researchers further
reduce the complexity of the algorithms while maintaining
the justified security notions [1].
B. CONTRIBUTION
Signcryption methods are already existing. Lightweight sign-
cryption is also emerging. However, the continuous devel-
opment of the embedded devices and tiny sensors urge the
development of ultra-light versions of the protocols. This
motivates us for the present research to extend the lightweight
property of our previously developed LiSP [13]. The main
contributions of this paper are:
1) We address the resource constraints of the IoT appli-
cability by the design of an extended light-weight
authentication.
2) We extend our previous work of LiSP [13] and modify
the hash with Keccak. This is customized to the mod-
ules as per the suitability of the operational environ-
ment. Moreover, we use Elli encryption which is itself
a light weight. Thus, LiSP is lighter than previous.
3) We perform extensive simulation on our proposed sign-
cryption and the state-of-the-art schemes. The compar-
ative study confirms the superiority of LiSP-XK over
others based on complexity and energy consumption.
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The rest of the paper has been organized as follows. Section II
reviews some recent developments of light-weight protocols
for IoT authentication. Section III shows the proposed work.
Section IV shows the results and Section V concludes the
paper.
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FIGURE 2. 3-Layer architecture of IoT.
II. RELATED WORK
The expanded applications of IoTs has drive demand for new
methods of security. Moreover, the resource constraints of
ubiquitous and pervasive computing, Wireless Sensor Net-
works (WSNs) and Industrial IoTs (IIoTs) often require less
complex methods with more security performance. There
are various authentication schemes available in IoTs; bio-
metrics and two factor authentications are more in use
out of all [16]. However, two factor authentications face
cryptanalysis problems and need further improvement [17].
In this section, we review some of the state-of-the-art
methods of authentication protocols. We segregate the
methods in two parts: existing light-weight authentication
protocols; and signcryption and light-weight signcryption
techniques.
A. LIGHT-WEIGHT AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
The SPRA (Scalable Pseudo-random RFID private mutual
Authentication) protocol [18] uses a Pseudo-Random
Number Generator (PRNG) and secures systems against
various attacks. The Dass-Om method is light-weight
RFID authentication protocol which uses PRNG and hash
functions [24]. This method had authentication problems
and was updated [25]. An extended version of [25] is
discussed in [26].
For RFID tag security, Gui and Zhang [19] describe
a light-weight authentication method that authenticates
the RFID device, the RFID reader and the database.
Moosavi et al. [20] defines a light-weight authentication
that uses ECC and D-Quark hashing techniques. This proto-
col reduces communication overhead and also provides less
memory consumption. A session key attack resistant authen-
tication scheme is shown in [21]. A token-based light-weight
authentication protocol - Dynamic Token-based Authentica-
tion Protocol (DTAP) [22] uses three component requests,
a token and a response. Unfortunately, it does not provide
security against confidentiality attacks. In [23], a hash-based
light-weight mutual authentication protocol where RFID tags
move within clusters, and each cluster authenticates every tag
that enters its cluster.
AnOTP-based authenticationmethod is researched in [27],
and a key-agreement emphasized light-weight authentication
protocol in [28]. In [29], the authors use intuitive hashing
with XOR technique to make the protocol light-weight. Users
also have privilege to update the password. A different type of
light-weight authentication protocol has been defined in [30],
and where whole cryptographic function is based on IKv2
(Internet Key Exchange version 2) and uses block chaining
using Advance Encryption Scheme (AES) in Cipher Block
Chaining (AES-CBC) mode, along with ECDH (Elliptic
Curve Diffie Hellman) for the key exchange.
The work proposed by authors in [31] is a light-weight
authentication protocol based on various techniques such as
ECC, PRNG, and public-key cryptography. The main feature
of this protocol is that it provides mutual authentication for
both server and tags. However, it fails to secure the network
from DDoS attacks. In [32], the authors show a light-weight
key agreement mutual authentication protocol. The main fea-
ture of this protocol is to secure the data from an unauthorised
user of the cloud server. With security validation, the authors
use Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic.
In [33], the authors propose a light-weight mutual authen-
tication protocol called as Attestation and Authentication of
Low Resources Things (AAoT). This protocol is based on
Physical Unclonable Function (PUF). PUFs help in filling
memory randomly. This approach helps in resource constraint
usage and also helps in the creation of trust zone for every
physical device in the network. This is known as PUF-based
Root-of-Trust (PUFRoT). On the other hand, AAoT fails
to secure the network form collision and impersonation
attacks.
The major applications of IoT have been observed in
healthcare and medical things, smart grids, and drone net-
works. Almost all the application fields of IoTs have
researched some dimension of light-weight authentication
schemes in recent years. For healthcare field, the major con-
tributors of authentication schemes include: a light-weight
authentication protocol for cloud-based health-care systems
(LAPCHS) [34]; a two-factor authentication scheme for
Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) [35]; Secure and
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light-weight RFID authentication protocol for Medical IoT
(SecLAP) [36]; a light-weight mutual authentication and key
agreement protocol for remote surgery application in tactile
internet environment [37], and authentication for e-healthcare
using 5G [38]. Some other health-related approaches are also
seen in [39]–[41].
Smart grid-based applications of light-weight authentica-
tion are observed in [42]–[45]. Other important research
directions on light-weight authentications are well config-
ured in [46]–[53]. Though the developed approaches pro-
vide enhanced light-weight methods, there is still scope
for improvement to reduce the complexity and time con-
sumption of the methods by integrating the concept of
signcryption.
B. LIGHT-WEIGHT SIGNCRYPTION
In our previous work [13], we developed a signcryption
protocol using the PHOTON hash [68], and showed that the
number of iterations and keysize is less as compared to other
generic protocols. In [54], a signcryption-based protocol uses
heterogenous environment with online and offline signcryp-
tion mode. The offline phase does the major computational
tasks and the online phase deals with low computing tasks.
A hyper-elliptic curve is also used in signcryption as shown
in [55] and uses the Hyper-Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm
Problem (HECDLP). Another ECC-based light-weight sign-
cryption protocol is discussed in [56]. A recent development
for light-weight signcryption for WBAN is observed in [57],
while a certificate-based option is outlined in [58].
For vehicular networks and trusted IoT, there has
been an increase in the usage of signcryptions, such as
in [59] and [60]. Industrial applications are also resource-
constrained, and one such development is discussed in [61].
Some other signcryption developments are observed in
[62]–[64].
From the above discussion of the existing light-weight
protocols and the technology prediction of connected devices,
it is required for the development of efficient light-weight
signcryption protocols. The reason for choosing signcryption
for our present research is due to its simplicity of execution
compared to sign-then-encryption process. We also consider
our previous work [13] for our present extended version.
In the paper, we customize LiSPwith Keccak hash. Themajor
contribution of the presented work is:
• The use of Keccak as a light-weight sponging method.
• The use of hashchain in Keccack.
• The reduction of number of keys, time consumption and
memory consumption.
III. PROPOSED WORK
We assume LiSP-XK to be applicable for client-server
applications and peer-to-peer network, and where the key
generator is secure and untampered. A distributed key gen-
erator system can also be utilized like distributed public-
keys; however, in the present work we concentrate on LiSP
and the out mode of extension and customization, as per
the requirement of better light-weight property as compare
to LiSP. Keys generated by the key generator are shared
through a secure channel. The sender then signs the message
by finding the hash of the message and encrypts it using
their private key. Here, we use the hashchain using a random
number of iterations. Signing and encryption of message
are done in a single step under signcryption process. When
the receiver receives the signcrypted text, they first decrypt
the message to find its hash. This hash value is compared
with the value found by unsigning the message. If both the
hash values are matched, the message is authenticated other-
wise the transaction is discarded. The proposed signcryption
scheme for authentication in IoT consists of three phases:
i) setup and key generation phase; ii) signcryption phase;
and iii) unsigncryption process. In the following subsections,
we discuss each of the phase in detail.
A. SETUP AND KEY GENERATION
We use the Key Generator and Verifier (KGV) module as
mentioned in our previous work [13]. The master keys are
denoted as master private key (Mpvr ) and master public-key
(Mpub). The sender’s and receiver’s keys are used with master
keys, hashchain values and random numbers. For the hash,
we use the Keccak sponge construction with the specification
of Parallel Keccak-f[1600] [65]. The reason of choosing the
Keccak family for the hash is due to its memory utilization
capacity. Moreover, it avoids a feed-forward mechanism and
saves a lot of memory registers at the cost of an invertible
iterative process. It also helps in providing a lower (second)-
preimage security for the same internal state size. We use this
hash function for a hashchain.
The hashchain is constructed with the help of a random
number generated from the SRFG [66]. This random number
provides the random number of iterations on a secret seed
value given as the input to SRFG. The last value of the
hashchain is considered as the public salt and used for further
process. The public salts changes after few transactions and
is decided by KGV. The secret seed value is chosen on a
hyper-elliptic curve given by y2 + h(x)y = f (x), and where
f (x) is a polynomial degree n = 2g+ 1 > 4 or n = 2g+ 2 >
4 with n distinct roots and h(x) is a polynomial of degree
< g + 2. g is the genus >1. We use ρ1, ρ2 as the group
generators of an additive and a multiplicative cyclic group
G1 and G2 from the given curve. Both the sender and the
receiver have their identities. We generalize it as a node ID
denoted as NID. This identity is further used to generate the
public and private keys. The master private and public-keys
are given as (Mpvr , Mpub). The private key and public-key
of nodes are given as {NIDpvr }, {NIDpub}. For the simplicity
of expression, we use Ns and NR to represent sender and
receiver, respectively. The steps of the key generation process
is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Thus, the public-private keypair for sender becomes:NSpub ,
NSpvr and the public-private keypair for receiver becomes:
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Algorithm 1 Key Generation
1: Input: NID, Salt
2: Output: NIDpvr , NIDpub
3: Select a random number r on y2 + h(x)y = f (x)
4: Mpvr = H (SID).r where, SID is the identity of the KGV
or trusted server
5: Mpub = H (SID).ρ1
6: NIDpvr = (Mpvr .Salt)||H (NID)
7: NIDpub = Mpub||H (NID)
NRpub , NRpub . These keys are used further for signcryption and
unsigncryption process.
B. SIGNCRYPTION PHASE
The process of signcryption is summarized in Algorithm 2.
With this, the sender initiates the signcrypts with a message
before sending it towards receiver. The sender chooses λ
randomly from (.) operation of G1.G2. It then computes: R
using inverse λ function; its private key NSpvr ; and group
generators ρ1.ρ2. The message (M ) is concatenated with λ
and we encrypt it with receiver’s public-key NRpub . For this
We use Elli for the encryption process [67]. We then use
the Keccack hash for {C,R, t} where t is the timestamp of
the operation. Finally, the transmitting message becomes as
C = {C,R, τ } and it is sent to the receiver.
Algorithm 2 Signcryption Phase
1: Input: G1, G2, ρ1, ρ2, M
2: Output: C
3: Select λ ∈ G1.G2
4: R = λ−1(NSpvr + q),where q = ρ1.ρ2
5: C = E(λ||M ||t)NRpub
6: τ = H (C||R)
7: ϕ = (λ.λ) mod q
8: return C : {R,C, τ }
The full signcrypted message is C = {R,C, τ, ϕ}.
C. UNSIGNCRYPTION PHASE
The process of signcryption is summarized in Algorithm 3.
With this, the receiver initiates the unsigncryption process
once it receives C. The first step in this phase is matching
of hash on the received components. It calculates τ
′
by using
the Keccack hash function on (C||R). If τ
′
is matched with
received τ , C is processed further, otherwise it is discarded
due to an integrity failure. The receiver then decrypts C using
its private key NRpvr and obtains the message M , the value
of λ, and the value of t . If this t < tarr + δ (where tarr is
the arrival time and δ is the system synchronization error),
unsigncryption process execution continues, else the process
is aborted due to the stale timestamp invalidity. The receiver
calculates ϕ′ with modulo operation on (λ.τ ′). If the calcu-




2: Output: Acceptance or rejection
3: τ ′ = H (C||R)
4: If (τ ′ == τ )
5: Go to step 6
6: Else
7: Discard C
8: {M , λ, t} ← D(C)NRpvr
9: if (t < tarr + δ)
10: Goto Step 13
11: Else
12: Abort process ();
13: ϕ
′
= (λ.τ ′) mod q
14: if (ϕ′ == ϕ)
15: M is validated with signcryption and accepted
16: Else
17: M is discarded
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In this section we describe the experimental setup to study the
LiSP-XK performance based on complexity, memory con-
sumption and time consumption. For each of the experimental
study, we use 50 rounds of operations and we represent the
average value. The modularization of the method is also
analysed. We compare LiSP-XK with our previous work
LiSP [9] and other three existing approaches as mentioned
in Liu et al. [57], Zhou et al. [58], and Elkhalil et al. [59].
A. EXPERIMENTAL CONFIGURATION
For the experiments, we consider 20 nodes (devices) includ-
ing 10 mobile phones and 10 laptops. We choose these
devices due to their resource constraints as the primary goal of
the light-weight systems being compatible with these devices.
The wireless medium uses Wi-fi 802.11 a/b/g/n/ac. The con-
sideredmemory size of the devices varies from 4GB to 10GB
to check the memory utilization. Cisco IC3000 Industrial
Compute Gateway is used as the server/workstation whose
processor is 4-core Intel Rangeley with 8 GB DRAM and RJ-
45 traditional console connector. We also check the LiSP-XK
validity in Automated Validation of Internet Security Proto-
col and Applications (AVISPA) and it has been found that
LiSP-XK is safe. The hardware and software specification is
listed in Table 1.
B. COMPARATIVE RESULTS
We execute all the existing works and our proposed LiSP-XK
on the same platform and experimental setup as mentioned
in Table 1. We compare the results based on complexity,
energy consumption and memory consumption to check
the light-weightness of LiSP-XK. We first show the steps
involved for the authentication in the processes. The com-
parison is shown in Table 2. Note that the steps mentioned
in Table 2 are not the same as per the algorithms. We mention
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TABLE 1. Experimental specification.
TABLE 2. Authentication process comparison (single authentication).
the steps as per the process perspectives. From this table,
it is clear that LiSP-XK is executable in a lower number of
steps of the process. This perspective leads to the efficiency of
LiSP-XK towards the light-weight direction. The next study
that we have executed is to measure the communication cost
and computation cost. We compute the communication cost
in terms of bits and computation cost in terms of process
complexity. The bits measurement are as follows. The unique
identities use 160 bits, the random number uses 128 bits,
the hash outputs (Keccak) are of 256 bits, and the timestamp
is of 64 bits. We use a message size of 1024 bits.
The total cost for a single key exchange between two nodes
becomes (160 + 256 + 256) and which is 672 bits. So,
the communication cost for key exchange becomes (672 +
672 + 128) and which is 1472 bits. Now, to transfer the
signcrypted message C , the communication cost of C =
256+160+256+128+64, and which is 864 bits. As a result
of communication costs including key exchange and message
exchange for LiSP-XK is (1472+ 864) we get 2,336 bits.
We have used 100 iterations for the measurement of
communication cost and then the average value is con-
sidered. Table 3 shows the comparison of communication
cost for all the signcryption schemes under observation.
It shows that LiSP-XK is 10%, 28.4%, 14.1% and 16.5%
better efficient in communication cost as compared to the
schemes mentioned in [13] and [57]–[59], respectively. The
use of light-weight public-key cryptography, Keccak hash,
TABLE 3. Communication cost comparison.
and reduced the size of random number and timestamp and
has intensified the results maintaining the suitable security
parameter. To compute the complexity, we first define the
operational time parameters as shown in Table 4. These
time parameters are measured on the hardware configura-
tion mentioned in Table 1 and used for all the schemes in
comparison. The unit for this metric is milliseconds (ms).
Note that the other existing schemes use different hashing
and encryption-decryption processes leading to the increased
time of operations. The comparison of the computation com-
plexity is shown in Table 5. The observations and calcula-
tions denote that, our LiSP-XK is less complex by 39.2%,
26.1%, 39.9% and 25.6% as compared to the works in [13]
and [57]–[59], respectively. This proves that LiSP-XK is
lighter than the existing schemes and thus applicable for
resource-constrained environments.
The increasing demand of IoT applications also empha-
sizes energy consumption and memory consumption.
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TABLE 4. Time for related operation.
TABLE 5. Computation costs comparison.
FIGURE 3. Comparison of residual energy parameter.
The reason for these considerations is due to the
resource-constrained devices with low memory sizes. There-
fore, we require to check the energy consumption and mem-
ory utilization ratio for LiSP-XK and compare it with the
other existing approaches. To measure the energy efficiency,
we use the residual energy as mentioned in [13]. The formula
used for this is given as:
Energyres =
∑n
i=1 Energyinit − EnergyT
number of iterations
(1)
where, Energyinit is the initial energy of the nodes and
EnergyT is the energy of the nodes after the time-period T .
The comparative study of energy has been shown in Figure 3.
It shows that LiSP-XK consumes 33.5% less energy. Note
that, it has been calculated as residual energy for overall nodes
and then the average has been counted for the comparison.
We can also see that LiSP-XK stands apart from the other
signcryption approaches in comparison. As we have used Elli
and Keccak - the two light-weight cryptographic methods -
computation is less complex and therefore, energy consump-
tion is less as compared to others. Resource consumption is an
important factor in energy constrained devices. We consider
here two types of resources tomeasure: memory consumption
and CPU utilization. First, we observe the memory consump-
tion behaviour of the systems by checking the utilization of
FIGURE 4. Comparison of memory consumption.
FIGURE 5. Comparison of CPU utilization.
memory space for varying the number of message transfers
from 10 to 100. The results are shown in Figure 4 in terms
of memory consumption out of available memory of the
nodes. Figure 4 shows that LiSP-XK is 30% better in memory
utilization. The results also show that LiSP-XK’s memory
utilization is better than the other schemes. The use of Keccak
reduces memory consumption and thus, our proposed scheme
obtains efficiency in this with benefits.
Next, we measure the CPU utilization. We show the com-
parative outcomes in percentage in Figure 5. It shows that
LiSP-XK provides 34.3% reduced CPU utilization which is
beneficial for resource constrained applications. As, the Kec-
cack and Elli both are light weight, these two helps to make
LiSP-XK to become more light weight as compared to LiSP.
Moreover, the reduced number of steps in computing and
efficient use of the key values are add on for this benefit.
C. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we analyze the security notions of LiSP-XK
on perspectives of attack handle and the requirements:
• Forward Secrecy: Forward secrecy of an authentication
scheme assurances that the session keys are not vulner-
able to be compromised, even if long-term secrets used
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in the session key exchange are compromised. In LiSP-
XK, the secret seed on the elliptic curve and λ both
are randomly chosen. Therefore, if any one of them is
compromised, the other parameter can still be secure.
Moreover, to provide further security, both the elliptic
curve seed and the random λ can be updated with extra
computation cost if required.
• Backward Secrecy: The use of random numbers (salt)
and hash helps in this process. As if the adversary gets
knowledge about the subset or partial key, the private
key derivation is quite unsuccessful and thus, LiSP-XK
is secure.
• Handling Impersonation: Suppose Eve impersonates
as an authorized entity in the network. To succeed with
her intention, a chooses randomly value of λ′. To send
the message, R = λ−1(NSpvr + q) needs to be calculated
byA. If the receiver does not identify the corresponding
public-key, it will be granted as an invalid message
following Algorithm 2.
• HandlingReplay:Weuse the time-stamp validity check
for the receiver to process the message. This is able to
handle stale messages or replay messages.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we extend the LiSP signcryption to LiSP-XK
signcryption. We use Elli and Keccak as the light-weight
cryptographic modules to obtain the desired functionality
of the light-weight signcryption. We study the experimen-
tal outcomes of LiSP-XK and compare the results with
state-of-the-art schemes. It shows that LiSP-XK is overall
35% better in efficiency as compared to the other sign-
cryption approaches. The measured light-weight in terms
of reduced complexity, communication cost, energy and
memory consumption makes our LiSP-XK suitable for
resource-constrained environments such as IIoTs, WSNs and
others. In future, we will try to work on a suitable distributed
key generation mechanism for more effective results.
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